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INTRODUCTION
In September 2000, Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Maria
Lopez sentenced child molester Charles Horton to probation with
house arrest,' characterizing the defendant's molestation incident as a
t B.A., College of the Holy Cross, 1997; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2002.
1 The probationary sentence allowed Horton to return to the South Boston housing
project where the victim also lived. Jules Crittenden, Panel to Decide Judge's Future, BOSTON
HERALD, Apr. 13, 2001, at 3.
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"low-level crime"2 and disregarding the prosecutor's request for an
eight- to ten-year prison sentence.3 Horton, while dressed as a
woman, lured a twelve-year-old boy into his car and forced him to sim-
ulate oral sex on a screwdriver. 4 Judge Lopez's arguably lenient sen-
tence provoked a media frenzy5 and widespread excoriation from
legislators, citizens, and victims' rights advocates. 6 Within days of Hor-
2 Sacha Pfeiffer, Cuban Roots Seen as a Key to Judge's Decisions, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12,
2000, at Bi.
3 See Jay Lindsay, Judge's Leniency Enrages Critics, SUN-SENTINEL (South Florida), Sept.
17, 2000, at 8A. A Boston Globe investigation found that Judge Lopez frequently imposes
sentences that are sharply at odds with prosecutors' requests. See Pfeiffer, supra note 2. For
instance, Judge Lopez sentenced four defendants in sex-crime cases to probation in Mid-
dlesex Superior Court in the spring of 2000. Three of the men were charged with raping
or sexually assaulting minors, while the fourth man was charged with beating and raping
his former girlfriend. Marcella Bombardieri, Lawyers Alarmed by Calls to Oust Lopez, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 18, 2000, at B1. As a result of Judge Lopez's sentences, the state's sex of-
fender registry will list none of the four if they follow the terms of their probation. Id.
Complaints of undue leniency also have arisen over a 1992 case in which Judge Lopez
refused to keep convicted killer Matthew Rosenberg in jail after his juvenile sentence for
killing his five-year-old neighbor had expired. See Lindsay, supra; Pfeiffer, supra note 2.
4 Brian MacQuarrie, Cellucci, Legislators Turn Up Heat on Judge, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
12, 2000, at Al.
5 The story leaked when Suffolk County District Attorney Ralph C. Martin II's office
notified the media of Horton's sentence. John McElhenny, Cellucci Wants Prosecutors to
Have Appeal Rights on Sentences, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 11, 2000, LEXIS, AP File.
On a wholly unrelated, yet rather intriguing note, the prosecutor's tattling incident
was not the first time Judge Lopez has experienced the wrath of attorneys who have unsuc-
cessfully argued before her. In 1994,Judge Lopez presided over a highly publicized case in
which a jury found that supermarket chain owner Telemachus Demoulas had defrauded
his sister-in-law and her family of $850 million. AfterJudge Lopez ruled against Demoulas,
the losing attorneys, Gary C. Crossen and Richard K. Donahue, Sr., instituted an elaborate
ruse aimed at proving that the judge was biased against their client. See Peter S. Canellos &
Judy Rakowsky, Pawn Fights Back in High-Stakes Arena, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 1997, at Al.
The two prominent attorneys fooled a former clerk to Judge Lopez into believing that
a nonexistent offshore company was recruiting him for a high-paying position. They
rented offices in Nova Scotia and New York, where it is legal to tape conversations surrepti-
tiously, hired actors, printed phony business cards, and staged a fake job interview with the
clerk in an effort to obtain damaging information aboutJudge Lopez. See id. The scheme
unraveled, and the two attorneys now face disciplinary action before the state's bar. Ralph
Ranalli, Lawyers in Demoulas Case Face Bar Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2002, at B2.
6 Most of the responses to Judge Lopez's decision and to her accompanying com-
ments belittling the prosecutor during trial-footage that was captured on videotape and
aired repeatedly by the local media-were of general outrage. See Andrea Estes & Frank
Phillips, Legislators' Trip with Lopez Raises Questions, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al
(noting thatJudge Lopez's actions "sparked a public outcry and calls for her ouster"). One
representative and impassioned letter to the editor appearing in The Boston Globe ex-
claimed, "If Judge Lopez's unprofessional behavior is excused and she remains uncen-
sured, God save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." Hank Maiorana, Judge's Conduct
Cannot Be Excused, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2000, at A22.
Some supporters, however, also emerged to vocalize their support. The Massachusetts
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers issued a statement labeling calls to investigate or
remove Judge Lopez "an outrageous and alarming attack on the independence of the judi-
ciary." Bombardieri, supra note 3. Similarly, one Boston Globe reader defended Judge Lo-
pez, writing:
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ton's sentencing, Massachusetts State Senator James Jajuga filed a
complaint againstJudge Lopez with the State Commission on Judicial
Conduct, while House Minority Leader Francis Marini filed a bill of
address, co-signed by other legislators, to begin the process of remov-
ingJudge Lopez from the bench.7 Governor Paul Cellucci responded
by filing legislation that would give prosecutors a sentence appeal
right analogous to that already enjoyed by defendants.8
The response to Judge Lopez's sentencing in the Horton case is
paradigmatic of a national climate characterized by pervasive criticism
of the state and federal judiciary.9 Coinciding with this criticism is a
panoply of attempts to stifle 'Judicial activism" 10 and "leniency.""
The widespread creation of mandatory minimum sentencing guide-
lines represents one such attempt, while another increasingly com-
mon strategy is that which House Minority Leader Marini adopted in
response to the Lopez scandal: instituting impeachment proceedings
against disfavored judges.12
The prosecutorial sentence appeal legislation proposed in Massa-
chusetts fits within this broad category of efforts to control the judici-
ary. Time-tested, many of these efforts have unduly impaired judicial
discretion and independence. The Massachusetts proposal is fairly
Ajudge with the courage to disappoint the district attorney's office runs the
risk of being pulverized in the press by mediocre minds.
I appear regularly in Middlesex County Superior Court. In my opin-
ion, Judge Lopez is one of only a handful of thinking judges on the bench
today. She is also a rare commodity- ajudge who refuses to be intimidated
by the district attorney's office.
Kevin J. Mahoney, Attacks on Judge Peril Our Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2000, at A18
(letter to the editor).
7 Lindsay, supra note 3; MacQuarrie, supra note 4. The bill is still pending. See Tom
Farmer, Judge Lopez Under Fire for Son's Booze Bash, BOSToN HE.RALD, Jan. 3, 2002, at 1. The
Judicial Conduct Commission also appointed a special investigator to explore reports that
Judge Lopez and her supporters started a "whisper campaign" to discredit the victim in an
effort to bolster her claim that Horton's case involved "'mitigating circumstances.'" Id.
The special investigator has yet to submit his report. See id. For additional accounts of the
allegations concerning Judge Lopez's conduct and the resulting investigation, see Jose
Martinez, Mom's Anger:. Sex-Assault Wctims Kin Lashes Out at Judge Lopez, BOSTON HERALD,
June 18, 2001, at 1; Frank Phillips, Inquiry on Judge Said to Focus on Victim, 11, BOSTON
GLOBE,June 14,2001, at Al; andjack Sullivan,Judge's Husband Fights Back: Mindich Battles to
Keep E-Mails Private, BOSTON HERALD, July 13, 2001, at 3.
8 See MacQuarrie, supra note 4. The Governor also responded by calling for tougher
mandatory prison terms and by announcing that his legal staff would analyze the implica-
tions of the bill of address filed by House Minority Leader Marini. Id.
9 See AN INDEPENDENTJUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA CoMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF
PoWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1997) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], at http://
www.abanetorg/govaffairs/judiciary/report~html (noting that "[a] new cycle of intense ju-
dicial scrutiny and criticism is now upon us").
1O See id. § IV.A.l.
11 See id.
12 See, e.g., id. (citing a booklet widely circulated on Capitol Hill urging members of
Congress "to initiate impeachment proceedings against 'activist' judges, regardless of
whether such efforts are likely to result in removal").
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unique in that only a minority of states have enacted prosecutorial
sentence appeal statutes, 13 even though the Supreme Court estab-
lished the constitutionality of such legislation in the early 1980s. 14
This Note explores the forgotten doctrine to determine its potential
revival as a reform measure in state sentencing law.
Part I of this Note examines the constitutional basis for a
prosecutorial sentence appeal right as established by the Supreme
Court in United States v. DiFrancesco.15 It then documents the use of
the doctrine in both the federal and state systems and discusses the
key components of the legislation proposed in Massachusetts. 16 Part
II reviews those forces that threaten the judiciary's independence and
discretion, and explores what is perhaps the most serious of these
forces: mandatory minimum guidelines. Part II also offers insights
into the social sentiments and policy stances that have influenced the
development of sentencing law over the past two decades, and at-
tempts to demonstrate why many state legislatures have disregarded
the prosecutorial sentence appeal doctrine in favor of mandatory
minimums. Part III argues that a prosecutorial sentence appeal right
is a more appropriate response than other more prevalent efforts to
counteract weaknesses in the judicial system, and outlines a handful of
recommendations for sentencing law reform at the state level.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Constitutional Framework for Prosecutorial Sentence
Appeals
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides:
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
13 In contrast, a distinctive feature of criminal justice systems abroad is the extension
of the right of appeal to both defendants and prosecutors. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Com-
parative CriminalJustice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can
We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REv. 539, 682 (1990) (discussing
prosecutorial sentence appeals in France); Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German
Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C.
INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 317, 348 (1995) (Germany). Canada also provides for broad appel-
late review of sentencing. See Lois G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES OF MANDATORY SENTENCING 52 (1994).
14 United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
15 Id.
16 The primary focus of this Note is on prosecutorial sentence appeals at the state
level. A related issue is whether prosecutors should have the right to obtain review of bail
decisions rendered by state courts. On the federal level, the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. I, § 205, 98 Stat. 1837, 1986, was amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3731 to
permit the government as well as a detainee to appeal from a district court order either
granting or denying bail. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1994). This topic is beyond the scope of
the present discussion, although many of the arguments set forth herein apply to bail deci-
sion review with equal force.
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put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ,1"7 The Clause encompasses three
distinct values: "(1) the integrity of jury verdicts of not guilty, (2) the
lawful administration of prescribed sentences, and (3) the interest in
repose."1 8 The U.S. Supreme Court summarized the protection that
the Clause affords as follows: "It protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal; it protects against a second prose-
cution for the same offense after conviction; and it protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense." 19
What the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against is a
unilateral 20 government appeal for the purpose of increasing a sen-
tence considered unreasonable or unduly lenient. The Supreme
Court first established this principle in United States v. DiFrancesco,21 in
which it upheld a statute authorizing the government to appeal a sen-
tence imposed upon a "dangerous special offender."22 The
DiFrancesco Court held that prosecutorial sentence appeals authorized
by statute do not violate the Fifth Amendment,23 reasoning that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not accord criminal sentences the con-
stitutional finality of acquittals24 and "confers upon defendants no
right to know the duration of their sentences at any specific time."25
17 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18 Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of
Criminal Sentences, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 1001, 1002-03 (1980) ("Each value is entirely distinct
from and theoretically independent of the others, all being related to one another only by
the 'rubric' of the [D]ouble [:leopardy clause." (footnotes omitted)).
19 United States v. Warneke, 199 F.3d 906, 907 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)).
20 Prior to the decision in United States v. DiFrancesco, federal decisional law held that
an increase in a valid sentence following a conviction violated the DoubleJeopardy Clause.
Jeffrey Allen Cohen, Note, In the Wake of DiFrancesco: Derogation of the Multiple Punishment
Bar of the DoubleJeopardy Clause 17 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 923, 923 (1983). In contrast, several
states had already allowed the prosecution to cross-appeal a defendant's own sentence ap-
peal for the purpose of seeking an increase. At the time of the decision, however, no state
permitted the prosecution to initiate such an appeal. Westen, supra note 18, at 1001 n.3;
see also Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900) (holding that when a sentence has
been vacated after challenge by the defendant, the subsequent imposition of an increased
sentence does not offend Double Jeopardy).
21 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
22 Cohen, supra note 20, at 923-24.
23 The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HAv. L. REv. 91, 112 (1981).
24 DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 134. The Court relied on Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160
(1947), for the proposition that constitutional finality does not attend to sentences. In
Bozza, the defendant was convicted of a crime that carried a mandatory minimum sentence
of a fine and imprisonment. Id. at 165. The trial court incorrectly sentenced the defen-
dant only to imprisonment. Id. Later the same day, the judge recalled the defendant and
imposed both elements of the mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 165-66. The Court
held that the correction of the legally invalid sentence by the imposition of a harsher
sentence "did not twice put petitioner in jeopardy for the same offense." Id. at 167.
25 Cohen, supra note 20, at 924.
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DiFrancesco involved the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,26
which authorized sentence appeals to a U.S. Court of Appeals by ei-
ther the government or a defendant when the defendant was sen-
tenced as a "dangerous special offender."27 According to the Act, a
circuit court on review of a sentence could "affirm the sentence, im-
pose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing
court could originally have imposed, or remand for further sentenc-
ing proceedings."28 The Court reasoned that DiFrancesco could not
expect any measure of finality to attach to a sentence imposed under
the Act, even after he commenced serving his term, because the law
charged him with constructive knowledge of the statutory re-sentenc-
ing provisions. 29 The Act did not unlawfully oppress a guilty defen-
dant, the Court reasoned, but rather constituted "a considered
legislative attempt to attack.., the tendency on the part of some trial
judges 'to mete out light sentences."' 30
The Court further stated that the "Double Jeopardy Clause is not
a complete barrier to an appeal by the prosecution in a criminal
case," 31 and that "' [w]here a Government appeal presents no threat
of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not of-
fended."' 32 The Court thus held that "the Government's taking a re-
view of respondent's sentence does not in itself offend [D]ouble
[J] eopardy principles just because its success might deprive respon-
dent of the benefit of a more lenient sentence."33
The DiFrancesco Court went a step beyond simply determining the
constitutionality of government sentence appeals-it endorsed them.
The majority opinion concluded on the following note:
[S] entencing is one of the areas of the criminal justice system most
in need of reform.... [T] he "basic problem" in the present system
is "the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and dis-
criminatory." Appellate review creates a check upon this unlimited
power, and should lead to a greater degree of consistency in
sentencing.34
26 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 950-51, repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 212(a) (2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1987; see also DiFrancesco, 449
U.S. at 118 n.1, 120 n.2 (reproducing relevant portions of the Organized Crime Control
Act).
27 449 U.S. at 118-19.
28 Id. at 120 n.2 (quoting the Organized Crime Control Act).
29 See id. at 139.
30 Id. at 142 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 203 (1967)).
31 Id. at 132 (emphasis in original).
32 Id. (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-70
(1977)).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted) (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49 (1973)).
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The next section provides an overview of the prosecutorial appeal
legislation that Congress and the states have adopted since the
DiFrancesco decision.
B. Prosecutorial Sentence Appeal Legislation
1. Federal Law
The Sentencing Reform Act of 198435 permits both defendants
and prosecutors to appeal criminal sentences. 36 Either party may
challenge legality on the grounds that the sentence "was imposed as a
result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines,"37 or
that the sentence "was imposed for an offense for which there is no
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable." 38
Both parties may also challenge the severity of the sentence. The
defendant may appeal a sentence that is more severe than what the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines prescribe, 39 whereas the government, with
the approval of either the Attorney General or the Solicitor General,40
may appeal a sentence that is more lenient than what the Guidelines
prescribe. 41 The Senate Judiciary Committee explained that these
35 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994). See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the Sentencing Reform Act's genesis and the sentencing guidelines Congress
promulgated as a result of the Act.
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The Act eliminated the sentencing court's power to initiate
an appeal through a Rule 35 motion for the correction or reduction of a sentence. See FED.
K. CraM. P. 35(b), (c); Eighteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts ofAppeals 1987-1988 (pt. 2), 77 GEo. L.J. 931, 1137-38 (1989) [hereinafter
Annual Review]. In so doing, the Act limited the sentencing court's ability to adjust
sentences to correction upon remands of successful appeals. See Annual Review, supra, at
1137-38.
37 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a) (2), (b) (2).
38 Id. § 3742 (a) (4), (b) (4).
39 See id. § 3742(a) (3). The defendant may appeal a sentence that
is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to
the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprison-
ment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum established in
the guideline range, or includes a more limiting condition of probation or
supervised release ... than the maxinum established in the guideline
range.
Id.
40 Congress required this approval to ensure that the government does not routinely
file appeals for every sentence below the appropriate federal sentencing guideline range.
See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 154 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3337.
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (3). The government may appeal the sentence if it
is less than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to the
extent that the sentence includes a lesser fine or term of imprisonment,
probation, or supervised release than the minimum established in the
guideline range, or includes a less limiting condition of probation or super-
vised release.., than the minimum established in the guideline range ....
12652002]
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provisions were designed to reduce unwarranted sentencing
disparity. 42
If the appellate court finds that the lower court imposed a sen-
tence in violation of the law as a result of an incorrect application of
the guidelines, or that the sentence is outside the applicable guideline
range and is unreasonable, the court must set aside the sentence and
remand for reconsideration, with any instructions it considers appro-
priate.43 Further, if the appellate court concludes that a sentence is
unreasonable, it must state specific reasons for its conclusion.44 The
appellate court must "give due regard to the opportunity of the dis-
trict court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept
the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly errone-
ous." 45 The court must also grant "due deference to the district
court's application of the guidelines to the facts." 46 The Act requires
sentencing judges to explain their reasons for particular sentencing
decisions, 47 thereby facilitating a stricter and more informed appellate
review.
2. State Law
Although the Supreme Court established the constitutionality of
prosecutorial sentence appeals over two decades ago, only a relatively
small number of states have since adopted these statutes. 48 Of those
that exist, many refer to the state's right to appeal "illegal" sentences,
while others use different wording to achieve the same effect. In es-
sence, an illegal sentence is one that departs from the requirements of
sentencing laws in some manner. In states with sentencing guidelines,
these "illegality" appeal statutes typically focus on instances of devia-
tion from the guidelines. States that have provisions for the appeal of
illegal sentences include Arizona,49 Delaware,50 Florida,5' Kansas,52
42 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 151 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3334.
43 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1)-(2).
44 See id. § 3742(f) (2).
45 Id. § 3742(e).
46 Id.
47 Id. § 3553(c).
48 See Lawyers Oppose Bill Giving Prosecutors Right to Appea4 PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 28,
2000, at C5.
49 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4032(5) (West 2001).
50 Delaware's statute states that "[t]he State shall have an absolute right to appeal any
sentence on the grounds that it is unauthorized by, or contrary to, any statute or court
rule, in which case the decision or result of the State's appeal shall affect the rights of the
accused." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 9902(f) (1999).
51 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.07(1) (e) (West 2001).
52 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4721(d), (e) (1995).
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Louisiana, 53 Minnesota,54 New Jersey,55 Ohio,56 Pennsylvania, 57 and
Tennessee.58
In contrast to these statutes, Alaska's enabling statute authorizes
prosecutors to appeal sentences on the broad ground of leniency.
Under the Alaska statute:
A sentence of imprisonment lawfully imposed by the superior
court may be appealed to the court of appeals by the state on the
ground that the sentence is too lenient; however, when a sentence is
appealed by the state and the defendant has not appealed the sen-
tence, the court is not authorized to increase the sentence but may
express its approval or disapproval of the sentence and its reasons in
a written opinion.59
A handful of statutes in guideline states incorporate both of these
approaches and provide for appeals on grounds linked to sentencing
guidelines and on broader grounds such as unreasonableness. Penn-
sylvania's statute, for instance, specifies a right to appeal when "the
sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guide-
lines but applied the guidelines erroneously,"60 as well as when "the
sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the
case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines
would be clearly unreasonable." 61 Similarly, the Tennessee statute
permits appeals when "[t]he court improperly sentenced the defen-
dant to the wrong sentence range,' 62 when "[t]he court improperly
found the defendant to be an especially mitigated offender,"6 or
where "[t]he enhancement and mitigating factors were not weighed
properly."64 And Minnesota permits the reviewing court to vacate or
set aside a sentence that is "inconsistent with statutory requirements,
unreasonable, inappropriate, ... unjustifiably disparate, or not war-
ranted by the findings of fact."65
53 LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 882 (West 1997).
54 MNmN. STAT. ANN. § 244.11 (2) (b) (West Supp. 2002).
55 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1 (f) (2) (West 1995).
56 The Ohio statute, like the Delaware statute, allows for appeals of sentences that are
"contrary to law." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.08(A) (4) (Anderson Supp. 2001).
57 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781(a) (West 1998).
58 TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-4-101 (2000); id. § 40-35-402(b) (1) (Supp. 2001).
59 ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.120(b) (Michie 2000).
60 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781 (c) (1).
61 Id. § 9781 (c) (2).
62 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-402(b) (1).
63 Id. § 40-35-402(b) (4).
64 Id. § 40-35-402(b) (5).
65 MiN1. STAT. ANN. § 244.11(2) (b) (West Supp. 2002).
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Some statutes also permit state appeals of noncustodial or proba-
tionary sentences. The NewJersey, 66 Ohio, 67 and Tennessee 68 statutes
have such provisions. The Ohio statute permits appeals by the prose-
cutor when the "sentence did not include a prison term despite a pre-
sumption favoring a prison term for the offense for which it was
imposed,"' 69 while the Tennessee statute broadly permits prosecutorial
sentence appeals whenever the court grants "all or part of the sen-
tence on probation."70 The NewJersey sentencing statute, in addition
to providing for appeals of non-custodial sentences, also contains a
provision that may have proved useful in the Horton case. The statute
requires that when the court imposes a noncustodial sentence for a
crime that resulted in serious injury or that involved a particularly vul-
nerable victim, the reasons for the noncustodial sentence must be en-
tered on the record.71
Like the Alaska statute, the legislation pending in Massachusetts
("Massachusetts Proposal") is broadly drafted, directing an appellate
panel of trial judges to "consider whether any such sentence is appro-
priate, excessively lenient or excessively harsh. ' 72 The panel would
hear appeals at least once every sixty days.73 The bill also provides
that the sentencing judge who imposed the sentence has the option of
"transmit[ting] to the appellate division a statement of his reasons for
imposing the sentence," and is required to "make such a statement
within seven days if requested to do so by the appellate division."74
The Massachusetts Proposal, if adopted, would integrate
prosecutorial sentence appeals into an indeterminate sentencing sys-
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2) (1995).
67 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.08(B) (1) (Anderson Supp. 2001).
68 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-402(b) (2).
69 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.08(B) (1).
70 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-402(b) (2).
71 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1 (g).
72 H.R. 3900, 182d Gen. Ct, Reg. Sess. § 2 (Mass.) [hereinafter Massachusetts Propo-
sal] (text of bill available on Westlaw at 2001 MA H.B. 3900 (SN)). The Massachusetts
Proposal was submitted to the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice on February 5, 2001,
was heard by that Committee on March 19, 2002, and became eligible for Executive Ses-
sion on that date. Under the proposed legislation, within ten days of the imposition of the
sentence, the appeal would be forwarded to a panel of three sitting Superior Court judges
designated by the chief Superior Court judge for a quick (within ninety days of the appeal
date) reasonableness review. Id. At present, Massachusetts has a statute that appears to
permit the prosecution to initiate an appeal of a sentence for the purpose of seeking an
increase; however, the First Circuit has construed the statute to mean that the prosecution
may not appeal except in response to a defendant's prior appeal. See MAss. ANN. LAWs ch.
278, § 28B (Law. Co-op. 1992); Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1971); Westen,
supra note 18, at 1001 n.3.
73 Massachusetts Proposal, supra note 72, § 1.
74 Id. §2.
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tern. 75 Part III.A of this Note addresses the merits of judicial appeals
in the context of an indeterminate sentencing scheme. Suffice it to
say here that such a system would establish a balance of power in the
courtroom, properly leaving sentencing discretion to judges while
equipping prosecutors with a powerful remedy with which to respond
to judicial sentencing error.
II
A SYSTEM IN NEED OF URGENT REFORM
A. A Judiciary Under Attack
The controversy that sparked the introduction of the Massachu-
setts Proposal is only one of the many instances in recent years in
which elected officials, the press, and the public criticized judges for
seemingly soft-on-crime decisions.76 In a 1981 address to the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA), ChiefJustice Warren Burger captured the
sentiments of many Americans when he asked, "Is a society redeemed
if it provides massive safeguards for accused persons.., and yet fails
75 This characterization must be qualified. Mandatory minimums are already in place
for drug offenses. See John Laidler, Action Looms on Criminal Sentencing, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 5, 2001, at 7. And while Massachusetts does not presently have sentencing guidelines
that have been enacted into law, the work of the Massachusetts Sentencing Commission is
not entirely without influence. The Commission first recommended sentencing guidelines
in 1997; however, the numerous bills it has filed on Beacon Hill over the years have been
unsuccessful. See Karen E. Crummy, Gov's Sentence-Appeal Bill Blasted as 'Waste of Time, Bos-
TON HERALD, Sept. 27, 2000, at 12. But as the Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice
Manual explains: "[A]s a practical matter, these guidelines are being used by prosecutors,
defense attorneys, probation departments and judges every day. The guidelines have be-
come a starting point for meaningful discussion about sentencing, and ajudge will likely
sentence within their framework." D. Dunbar Livingston et al., Sentencing and Alternative
Dispositions, in Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal Practice Manual § 22-6 (1999). The
Manual goes on to acknowledge the non-binding influence of the guidelines, noting:
"Each judge will have a different approach to using the Massachusetts Sentencing Guide-
lines... Somejudges will use the guidelines as written, as if they were already enacted into
law. Others will consult them for advice, and others are not interested in their highly
structured approach to sentencing." Id.
More recently, in May 2001, Acting GovernorJane Swift proposed her own mandatory
sentencing guideline bill. Franci Richardson, Swift Justice: Acting Gov Pushes Mandatory Sen-
tencing Guidelines, BOSTON HERALD, May 7, 2001, at 1. Then in October 2001, the Criminal
Justice Committee of the Massachusetts House of Representatives unveiled a plan that
crafted a compromise between previous failed proposals. See Ralph Ranalli, House Courts
Compromise with Its Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 2001, at B3. The House passed the com-
promise plan on October 9, 2001; however, no further action has been taken since the bill
was passed to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. See H.R. 4642, 182d Gen. Ct.,
Reg. Sess. (Mass.) (text of bill available on Westlaw at 2001 MA H.B. 4642 (SN)).
76 See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 9, § IV.A.l. The ABA Report describes the fallout
that occurred following an unpopular ruling in favor of a defendant by District Court
Judge Harold Baer of the Southern District of New York in 1996. According to the Repor4
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich threatened to
initiate impeachment proceedings, while President Clinton hinted that he might request
resignation ifJudge Baer did not change his ruling.
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to provide elementary protection for its law-abiding citizens?" 77 In-
deed, many Americans have come to regard the courtroom as a place
where the rights of the guilty are protected at the expense of the
rights of the innocent.78 They blame lenient judges for the crime on
the streets, ignoring the complex assortment of social and economic
forces which are the true causes of crime.7
9
Perceptions of judicial leniency have led to the mobilization of a
victims' rights movement 80 and to a nationwide call to strengthen pre-
vailing approaches to crime with "'more police, more prisons, and
more money for the criminal justice system.' '81 These movements
77 Sol Wachtler, Crime and Punishment, NEw YORKER, July 15, 1996, at 72, 72 (quoting
Chief Justice Burger).
78 Journalist Max Boot takes this view, characterizing one judge's sentence in a partic-
ular case as
display[ing] her weakness for geriatric thugs-and her disdain for the vic-
tims of crime....
It's a gross abuse of discretion for a judge to give [rapists], no matter
how advanced in years, nothing but probation. In all too many instances,
judges' leniency in handing out probation only creates more victims of
crime.
MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE BENCH 47
(1998).
79 One commentator has suggested that this mass misunderstanding of crime derives
partly from a persistent bombardment by the media of images portraying an ineffective
justice system. "[W] hile the docu-dramas and news tabloid shows repeatedly represent the
police as gallant warriors fighting the forces of evil, on the one side, mainstream news
constructions, on the other side, often personify the agents of crime control as... ineffec-
tive and incompetent." Gregg Barak, Media, Society, and Criminology, in MEDIA, PROCESS,
AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME: STUDIES IN NEWSMAKING CRIMINOLOGY 3, 11
(Gregg Barak ed., 1994). These portrayals are not consistent with the reality of crime in
America, but are largely distortions. See id. But because the "cultural visions of crime pro-
jected by the mass media ... are ... the principal vehicle by which the average person
comes to know crime and justice," see id. at 3, the crime problem has, in large part, been
blamed on our courts.
80 Thirty-three states have passed victims' rights amendments to their state constitu-
tions. See GOP Senator Pushes for Victims'Rights Amendmen CNN.coM, Feb. 5, 2000, at http:/
/wwwvi.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/02/05/gop.radio. In April 2000, Demo-
cratic Senator Dianne Feinstein of California and Republican SenatorJohn Kyl of Arizona
proposed a victims' rights amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but their proposal did not
come to a vote. See Yvonne Abraham, Victims' Rights Plan Draws GOP Response BoSToN
GLOBE, July 19, 2000, at A16. President Clinton supported a victims' rights amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, calling it a matter of"simple fairness." Clinton Wants a Victims' Rights
Amendment, CNN.com, June 25, 1996, at http://europe.cnn.com/US/9606/25/clin-
ton.victim.rights. President George W. Bush has also spoken out strongly in support of a
constitutional victims' rights amendment. See National Victims' Constitutional Amend-
ment Network, Recent News/Chronolog, at http://www.nvcan.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
Groups that oppose the adoption of a constitutional amendment for victims' rights
include the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Network to End Domestic Vio-
lence, and the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women. See Citizens
for the Fair Treatment of Victims, Organizations and Individuals Against the Amendment, at
http://www.geocities.com/citizensftv/against.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
81 Barak, supra note 79, at 11 (quoting RAY SURETrE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: IMAGES AND REALITIES 249 (1992)). This approach has been described as "fighting
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have, in turn, resulted in a multitude of threats to judicial indepen-
dence and discretion. The ABA Commission on Separation of Powers
and Judicial Independence explains: "A new cycle of intense judicial
scrutiny and criticism is now upon us; one that has been forming over
the last decade."8 2 This scrutiny threatens the core value of our judi-
cial system, "[a] n independent judiciary with judges who decide issues
under law without fear or favor."8 3
An ABA poll of "bar leaders" found that over two-thirds of the
respondents "perceived a major or a minor threat to decision-making
independence in their state."84 These respondents perceived four fac-
tors, in descending order of importance, as responsible for that
threat: "1) judicial [independence] is being eroded by excessive criti-
cism of judges; 2) judicial reelection is too politicized; 3) judicial se-
lection is too politicized; and 4) judges are too dependent on
campaign contributions."8 5
Judges are not above human error, and the First Amendment, of
course, fully protects criticism of judicial decisions.8 6 Criticism of
sentences for leniency may in certain circumstances reflect a misun-
derstanding of the judge's decisionmaking process.8 7 In other cir-
cumstances, allegations of undue leniency may be an accurate
assessment and may have a corrective influence on faulty decision-
making that otherwise would remain undetected.88 The challenge,
crime with more time." Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing:
The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 93, 93 (1999).
82 ABA REPORT, supra note 9, at Opening.
83 Id.
84 Id. § V.D.
85 Id. § V.D. In thirty-eight states, judges face some form of popular election. Id.
§ V.B. Whether a judge who is subject to elections can truly maintain independence on
the bench is a subject of debate. "'A key issue is whether judges can be independent if
their rulings can be the basis of a ... negative vote at the polls.'" Id. (quoting prepared
statement of Envin Chemerinsky, Feb. 21, 1997).
86 Id. §VI.B.1(a).
87 Aggravating this misunderstanding is the judicial convention that judges refrain
from entering the political fray to defend decisions that have been criticized. The follow-
ing excerpt from the ABA Report explains whyjudiciai silence is problematic:
One assumption underlying the First Amendment freedom to criticize
institutions of government is that, through an open exchange of ideas and
information, the truth may prevail, to the ultimate benefit of the govern-
mental institutions criticized. When a judicial decision is criticized, how-
ever, the author of that decision is often prohibited by the rules ofjudicial
ethics from entering the debate. As a consequence, the exchange of ideas
and information on the case in question is less than open, which increases
the risk that misinformation, rather than the truth, will emerge, to the ulti-
mate detriment of public confidence in the judiciary.
As one commentator observed, it is not a "fair fight" to leave the judges
to respond to unfair and inaccurate criticism without allies.
Id. § VI.B.1 (a) (3) (quoting Robert H. Henry, Address at the Meeting of the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers, Boca Raton, Fla. (Mar. 21, 1997)).
88 See id. § IV.A.1.
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then, is to strike an appropriate balance between judicial indepen-
dence and accountability.89
Contributing to perceptions of an imbalance between judicial in-
dependence and accountability is the absence of a requirement in
most states that trial judges articulate the reasons for the sentences
they impose.90 Opponents have emerged en masse to express their
outrage at the sentence rendered in the Horton case; however, the
sentence was not per se the result of undue leniency. There may have
been mitigating considerations-relating to both the victim and the
victimizer-rendering the sentence entirely appropriate and reasona-
ble under the circumstances. 91 However, in the absence of a written
opinion, one can only speculate as to the basis and propriety of Judge
Lopez's decision.92 Such unexplained decisions have led not only to
89 See id. § II (providing an overview of the independence-accountability debate).
90 See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1441, 1445 & n.22 (1997). In contrast, under
federal law, sentencing judges generally must explain their reasons for particular sentenc-
ing decisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1994).
91 See infra note 92 for a discussion of possible bases for Judge Lopez's sentencing
decision. See also Amy K. Tchao, Comment, One Step Forward, One Step Back: Emergency Re-
form and Appellate Sentence Review in Maine, 44 ME. L. REv. 345, 346-47 (1992) (discussing
the range of decisional factors relevant to the sentencing of a hypothetical child molester).
When faced with the formidable task of devising a sentence proportionate to the crime, a
judge will likely consider any of the following factors: the nature and seriousness of the
defendant's conduct, prior criminal convictions, psychological problems, and the impact
of the assault on the victim. See id. Another critical consideration is the need to protect
the public by incarcerating the defendant. Id. at 347. The judge must weigh these consid-
erations against the goal of rehabilitating the defendant, which might be best achieved
with a lesser period of incarceration or no incarceration at all. See id. To determine the
appropriate length of punishment, the sentencing judge must decide which of these con-
flicting goals is primary, and then assign relative weights to all of the other relevant vari-
ables. Id.
However, not all crimes within a particular category are deserving of the same punish-
ment and different judges may have cause to render different sentences. For instance, in
one child molestation case, victim impact may be especially severe, whereas in another, it
may be relatively less serious. See id. Mandatory sentencing guidelines attempt to ease the
sentencing judge's burden by fitting these complicated factors into a precise scientific
formula. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04. However, the sum of these factors in a
given case is neither precise nor scientific, and instead of easing the sentencing judge's
burden, such guidelines may often complicate it. See infra note 108 and accompanying
text.
92 Judge Lopez's silence on her reasons for giving Horton no jail time has sparked a
range of speculation in the Boston community regarding the basis for her decision. One
theory cast her Cuban origin as "a key to her temperament and her avowed skepticism
about government power.... Lopez comes from 'a tradition, a country and culture, with a
raised eyebrow about the government.'" Pfeiffer, supra note 2 (quoting a "court colleague
familiar with her background"). A group of supporters attempted to justify Judge Lopez's
decision by characterizing the molestation victim as a less-than-innocent individual. That
tactic backfired, creating greater controversy instead of diffusing it. See Ralph Ranalli, Eth-
ics-Law Limit on Judges at Issue in Lopez Dispute, BosTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2000, at A13. An-
other commentator speculated: "Charles Horton was given excessively lenient treatment
because he is a member of a victim class: a 'transgendered person.' Since he practices an
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charges of leniency, but also to attacks on the criminal justice system
for its failure to provide uniformity.93
B. The Misguided Response by the Federal and State
Governments
In response to inter-judge sentencing disparity and in an attempt
to reduce undue judicial lenity, the federal and state governments
have adopted increasingly severe sentencing laws since the 1970s.94
This movement rejected the merits of a rehabilitative approach 95 to
the criminal justice system in favor of a 'just deserts" philosophy.96
Proponents of mandatory sentencing laws argued that indeterminate
alternative lifestyle, he deserves special treatment because in judge Lopez's eyes Ihe repre-
sents diversity." Mark Charalambous, Heterosexual Fathers Receive No Justice in Child Custody
Cases, TELEGRAM & GAzETrE (Worcester, Mass.), Oct. 3, 2000, at Ag.
93 The Califomia Judges Association has developed a protocol for selected judges to
respond to allegations of leniency that are perceived as unwarranted through publication
or broadcast. See ABA REPORT, supra note 9, § VI.C. Similarly, some state and local bar
associations have developed their own methods of responding to criticism. Id. The ABA
has expressed concern as to the "propriety and desirability ofjudges defending decisions
of their brethren in the media." Id.
94 See Neil Steinberg, The Law of Unintended Consequences, ROLLING STONE, May 5, 1994,
at 33, reprinted in CIMINAL SENTENCING 41, 42 (Robert Emmet Long ed., 1995). Judge
Marvin E. Frankel is credited with sparking the movement for sentencing guidelines, pub-
lishing influential books on the subject in 1972 and 1976. See FORER, supra note 13, at 56 &
180 n.17.
95 See Elizabeth A. Parsons, Note, Shifting the Balance of Power: Prosecutorial Discretion
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 417, 430-32 (1994). Parsons
explains:
As crime increased, Americans wanted tougher sanctions for criminals.
Because of the growing number of repeat offenders, the public no longer
believed in the rehabilitative process. Americans thought the solution to
escalating crime was to send offenders to jail for a long time, rather than to
rehabilitate them. Accordingly, state govemments responded to their con-
stituencies' demands in the form of new sentencing systems.
... Following the state legislatures' lead, Congress... abandoned the
rehabilitative model.
Id. at 431-32 (footnotes omitted). Lois G. Forer, a former trial judge, offers another expla-
nation, placing the onus on lawmakers instead of constituents:
Legislators were motivated to "do something" about crime. "Soft judges"
were a ready target. The old philosophy of rehabilitating felons was
deemed to have failed.
... The doctrine of "just deserts" was appealing. Exactly what a felon
"deserves" as punishment for his or her offense was never articulated. It
was assumed to be either a long period of imprisonment or the death
penalty.
With little discussion and no empirical evidence as to the effect the
application of this theory would have on the public, the offenders and their
families, the courts, and the prisons, legislators embraced the new dogma.
FORER, supra note 13, at 8.
96 See FORER, supra note 13, at 61-63. Forer argues that the present sentencing model
is reflective of America's "rage to punish." According to Forer, this punitive model ignores
the social factors causing rising crime and recidivism, and disregards alternative solutions
to crime such as rehabilitation. See id. at 8-10.
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sentencing schemes permit judges to sentence criminals to minimum
time, thereby allowing them a swift opportunity to return to the streets
and recidivate. 97 More structured sentencing, they argued, would de-
ter crime while ensuring that criminals are punished. 98 Many states
and the federal government 99 established sentencing commissions,
and these commissions devised categories of offenses with corre-
sponding punishment ranges.100
A 1998 national survey conducted by the National Institute of'Jus-
tice reported that nineteen states presently have sentencing commis-
sions, while ten states have implemented mandatory sentencing
guidelines and seven states have adopted voluntary guidelines. 01 All
states employ some form of mandatory minimum sentences. 10 2 Typi-
cally, under sentencing guideline systems, sentence length is deter-
mined by reference to sentencing grids that incorporate two general
criteria: the nature of the crime and the background and character of
the defendant. 03 These general criteria are broken down further to
97 See, e.g., BoOT, supra note 78, at 51 (arguing that longer incarceration periods are
the solution to reducing crime).
98 But cf. FORER, supra note 13, at 62 (arguing that this deterrence theory is "patently
fallacious" in regards to street criminals, white-collar felons, and professional criminals
alike).
99 The federal version was the U.S. Sentencing Commission. See Parsons, supra note
95, at 420-21. The Commission's mandate was to help enact reform legislation to reduce
disparities in sentencing. See id. at 421. Accordingly, the Commission created sentencing
guidelines, which became effective on November 1, 1987. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note (2000).
100 See FoRER, supra note 13, at 56. One commentator argues that "since the passage of
the [Sentencing Reform Act of 1984], federal judges have not effectively helped develop
the rules which govern federal sentencing; they have been involved in sentencing, but
largely uninvolved in sentencing lawmaking." Berman, supra note 81, at 93.
101 James Austin, Sentencing Guidelines: A State Perspective, NAT'L INST.JUsT.J., Mar. 1998,
at 25, 25. Mandatory, or "presumptive," guidelines establish rebuttable presumptions
about appropriate sentences in individual cases. See id. Voluntary guidelines function as
suggestions that the judge may look to for guidance, but which are nonbinding. See
Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines, 23 CIUME & JuST. 199, 201
(1998). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not establish rebuttable presumptions but are
binding on the federal judiciary. Under the Guidelines, however, the judge may impose a
sentence outside of the applicable guideline range upon finding that the case includes an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance that the Sentencing Commission did not ade-
quately consider, or if the government makes a motion for a downward departure based on
.substantial assistance" to the government. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5K2.0 (1998); id. § 5Kl.1 (1989); Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure 88
GEO. L.J. 799, 1503-04 (2000).
102 See Austin, supra note 101, at 25. According to one commentator,
[F]orty states have mandatory minimums for repeat or habitual offenders,
and twenty-four of these states do so in the form of a Three Strikes mea-
sure; thirty-eight states impose mandatory minimums for crimes involving
use of a deadly weapon; thirty-six have mandatory minimums for drug pos-
session or trafficking; and thirty states impose mandatory minimums for
certain sex offenses.
Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punish-
ment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 851 (2000).
103 Tchao, supra note 91, at 348.
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incorporate a m6lange of fact-specific criteria such as presence or ab-
sence of a weapon, the amount of drugs in possession, and prior crim-
inal record. Sentence length is determined by locating the profile of
the defendant and his crime on the grid. 10 4 Under these sentencing
regimes, judges are no longer able to give flexible weight to the sun-
dry factors properly relevant to a sentencing decision. 10 5 As former
NewYork State judge Sol Wachtler stated, "[i]nstead, the judge simply
applies a graded scale, adds up points (a job that has already been
done by the prosecutor), and mechanically arrives at the sentence.' u06
As another critic maintained: "[Judges] can only process, stamping
defendants as they pass by like slabs of meat on a judicial conveyor
belt.' 0 7 In such a system, the punishment these laws force judges to
impose often does not fit the crime.'08
Moreover, mandatory sentencing laws cause judicial backlogs, re-
quire continual administrative oversight, and substitute judicial discre-
tion with prosecutorial discretion. 10 9 The increase in prosecutorial
discretion derives from the fact that the prosecutor's choice of which
104 Id.
105 See ForuR, supra note 13, at 58 ("[Judges] are required to follow guidelines that
make sense in the majority of cases but operate unfairly on large numbers of persons.
They are prohibited from considering facts and motives and conditions that should be the
basis of every sentence.").
106 Wachtler, supra note 77, at 72.
107 Colman McCarthy, Justice Mocked; The Farce of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, at
http://v.lectlaw.com/files/criO8.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
108 The story of Johnny Patillo, who is presently serving a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of ten years without parole for possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine, is
paradigmatic of the inflexible constraints mandatory minimum laws place on judges. See
Prisoners of the Drug War Johnny Patillo, at http://www.stopthedrugwar.org/prisoners/pa-
tillo.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2002). Mandatory minimum sentencing laws for drug of-
fenses take into account only two factors: the type of narcotic and its amount. See Eric E.
Sterling, Drug Laws and Snitching. A Primer (1999), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/snitch/primer. The result is that
the guy who sells the heroin to schoolchildren and the buddy who watches
out for the police are guilty of the same crime. The girlfriend who gives a
DEA informant the boyfriend's phone number and the mook who lets the
kilo sit in his locker overnight for $10 are also guilty of the same crime.
Steinberg, supra note 94, at 43.
Some judges have thrown up their hands in disgust at the injustices wrought by the
sentencing system and have resigned from the bench. Former trial judge Lois G. Forer was
ordered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to sentence a first-time robbery offender to
five years in the penitentiary in compliance with a mandatory sentencing law. FoRER, supra
note 13, at 2. "Faced with the choice of violating a court order or imposing a sentence that
[Forer] believed was contrary to long-established principles ofjustice and fairness," she left
the bench. Id. at 4. Anotherjudge in San Diego, Federal judge Lawrence Irving, resigned
in 1990 because of mandatory minimums, explaining that they "have destroyed the discre-
tion ofjudges." McCarthy, supra note 107. In 2001, U.S. District CourtJudge Edward F.
Harrington announced he would no longer hear criminal cases "as a protest against fed-
eral sentencing guidelines." J.M. Lawrence, Judge Riled by Guidelines Won't Take Criminal
Cases, BosroN HERALD, June 28, 2001, at 12.
109 See Tchao, supra note 91, at 348-49; Parsons, supra note 95, at 422-23.
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charges to bring dictates the judge's subsequent "choice" of which
sentence to impose. °10 By increasing or decreasing the number of
counts, or by bringing certain charges instead of others, a prosecutor
can have a decisive influence on sentence length."1 This dynamic
arguably threatens the separation of powers doctrine, for it vests the
sentencing power in the executive branch instead of in the
judiciary.112
Further, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, there is little in-
centive for the defendant to plea-bargain because the defendant can
calculate the likely punishment well before sentencing.113 This situa-
tion has prompted prosecutors to engage in fact bargaining (for ex-
ample, stipulating to certain facts, such as that a smaller quantity of
drugs was found in the defendant's possession, in return for the de-
fendant's cooperation) and charge bargaining (for example, drop-
ping certain charges in striking a deal). 114 Because sentencing judges
have little power to depart from the Guidelines, they are unable to
reign in these prosecutorial abuses when they occur." 5 The result is
that the Guidelines arguably produce even greater and more insidious
disparity than would an indeterminate model.116
III
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Prosecutorial Sentence Appeals as an Alternative to
Mandatory Sentencing Laws
The present system of sentencing laws, instead of alleviating many
of the difficulties judges encounter, serves only to perpetuate them by
110 See FoRER, supra note 13, at 173 n.3.
111 Parsons, supra note 95, at 422; see also Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution
and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1309, 1314-15 (1997).
112 See FORER, supra note 13, at 3. The enactment of the Guidelines provoked an outcry
from the federal judiciary. See Parsons, supra note 95, at 424. In fact, many judges disre-
garded the Guidelines until the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). See Parsons, supra note 95, at 424. There, the Court held that
Congress had not violated either the separation of powers doctrine or the nondelegation
doctrine by requiring federal judges to serve on the newly created Sentencing Commis-
sion. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412.
113 See FORER, supra note 13, at 63 ("Since the adoption of guidelines and mandatory
sentences, fewer defendants are willing to plead guilty knowing in advance the harsh
sentences that will be imposed. Many prosecutors now oppose these laws because of the
added burdens such trials impose.").
114 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear ofJudging and the State of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. LJ. 299, 343-50 (2000); cf Parsons, supra note
95, at 464 (describing how prosecutors may disadvantage defendants by presenting un-
charged or unproven offenses at the defendants' sentencing hearings in support of a sen-
tence enhancement).
115 See Parsons, supra note 95, at 423-24.
116 See Tchao, supra note 91, at 348 n.9.
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obliterating judicial discretion. These laws, and the frequent retalia-
tory response by legislators to independent-minded judges-the
threat of impeachment-essentially leave judges with their hands
tied.11 7 Legislatures have relegated sentencing judges to the task of
grid-reading, thus taking their ability to 'judge"-within the tradi-
tional meaning of the word-from them." 8 The resulting system
leads to far more irrational results than would a wholly discretionary
system and does nothing to restore the public's lost confidence in the
judiciary.
The first step in regaining this confidence and restoring the in-
tegrity of the judicial system is to return to a discretionary, indetermi-
nate sentencing model in which judges are given the freedom to judge.
This proposition may appear radical to those who fear that judges will
inevitably make grave mistakes under a discretionary system. The fol-
lowing anecdote by journalist Max Boot provides one example of this
fear of judicial error:
Kevin Roberson was furious with a former girlfriend.... He
drove over [to where she was]. Once he arrived, witnesses later tes-
tified, she ran into the shower and tried to hide from him. But he
found her, pistol-whipped her, and then shot her in the chest with a
9 millimeter semiautomatic....
What makes this tragedy even more disturbing is that it could
easily have been prevented. At the time of the shooting, Roberson
was awaiting trial in five cases, and he was still on probation for five
other crimes. It didn't take a genius to see that Roberson was not
somebody who should be on the street; though only twenty-three
years old, he'd already piled up fourteen convictions....
ButJudge Terry McDonald, of the 186th District Court in San
Antonio, Texas, simply refused to crack down on Roberson. Prose-
cutors had tried to revoke Roberson's probation, but McDonald re-
fused. On February 23, 1995, Roberson walked out of jail on a
$5,000 bond set by Judge McDonald. A month later, Roberson's
former girlfriend was dead." 9
The potency of anecdotes like the one above lies in their heart-
rending truth. Despite the inequities of mandatory sentencing laws,
one could argue that they are a necessary evil to prevent judicial leni-
ency. After all, had a mandatory sentencing scheme been in place,
Judge McDonald may never have had the chance to have Kevin Rober-
son released from police custody. Many state legislatures, however,
seem to have forgotten that there is an alternative to mandatory sen-
tencing laws that does not require a trade-off between discretion and
117 See, e.g., supra notes 12, 76 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
119 BooT, supra note 78, at 31-32.
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accuracy. Prosecutorial sentence appeals maintain judicial discretion
while at the same time providing a mechanism for correcting judicial
mistakes.
Returning to a discretionary system, then, does not require the
sacrifice ofjudicial accountability. In recognition ofjudicial fallibility,
state legislatures should uniformly adopt prosecutorial sentence ap-
peal legislation as an alternative to and substitute for sentencing
guidelines. As Governor George E. Pataki of New York explained in a
speech addressing his own proposed legislation:
[Prosecutorial sentence appeals] represent no attack on the ju-
diciary; [r]ather, they rest on the undeniable proposition that even
the best of judges make mistakes .... [T]hese mistakes can have
tragic consequences for the victims of domestic violence and other
crimes....
Our system of criminal justice is, after all, not just about
criminals, and lawyers, and judges and juries[.] ... It is about peo-
ple. Most of all, it is about the innocent people who are victims of
crime ....
The victims of crime love and laugh. They are just like you,
and they are just like me. They hope and dream. They are happy,
and they feel sadness. They get lonely, and they enjoy the company
of others. Too often, they get killed, and all of the joys and wonders
of their humanity are taken from them, and from us.120
While bordering on the melodramatic, Governor Pataki did con-
vey three appropriate rationales for the adoption of prosecutorial sen-
tence appeal legislation. First, he correctly assessed that "even the
best of judges make mistakes."'121 Sentence review, prompted by
prosecutorial appeals, could serve as a corrective for undue leniency,
just as it serves as a corrective for undue severity when it is the defen-
dant who appeals. 122 Second, unlike rigid guideline structures,
prosecutorial sentence appeals could provide a mechanism for cor-
recting errors without sacrificing judicial discretion. And third,
120 George Pataki, Law Day at Pace University School of Law, May 1, 1996, 16 PACE L. REV.
463, 468-69 (1996) (discussing a proposed bill that would have authorized prosecutorial
appeals of unduly lenient sentences).
121 Id. at 468.
122 Massachusetts Governor Cellucci also made an argument for parity of sentence ap-
peals between prosecutors and defendants in a letter to the Massachusetts legislature ac-
companying his filing of the Massachusetts Proposal in September 2000: "Current law
guards against excessively harsh sentences by allowing defendants the right to appeal their
sentences to the appellate division of the superior court. Prosecutors, however, have no
similar redress in the law to protect the public against the injustice of an excessively lenient
sentence ... ." Letter from Argeo Paul Cellucci, Governor of Massachusetts, and Jane
Swift, Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts, to the Massachusetts Senate and House of
Representatives (Sept. 12, 2000) (on file with author).
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prosecutorial sentence appeals could satisfy, at least to a degree, the
current public dissatisfaction with the judicial system 123 by instilling a
sense that error, when it occurs, will be corrected.
In short, prosecutorial sentence appeals may be the mechanism
by which state courts could finally achieve a balance between judicial
independence and accountability. Moreover, granting prosecutors
the same right to appeal as defendants creates symmetry, a core tenet
of the adversarial system. 124 And prosecutorial sentence appeals pro-
vide the judiciary with "the internal means to correct its own mis-
takes. 1 25 By dispensing with sentencing guidelines and adopting
prosecutorial sentence appeal legislation, states will return the sen-
tencing function to the branch in which it belongs-the judiciary. 126
Prosecutorial sentence appeal legislation may be conceptualized as a
compromise, 27 one which strikes an appropriate balance between the
rigidity of sentencing guidelines and the inevitable inconsistency and
occasional misjudgments of individual sentencing judges.128 Judge
Learned Hand once said that "while it is proper that people should
find fault when their judges fail, it is only reasonable that they should
recognize the difficulties [in judging].... Let [udges] be severely
brought to book, when they go wrong, but by those who will take the
trouble to understand."' 29 Prosecutorial sentence appeals brought
before review boards composed of other judges would accomplish
Judge Hand's aspiration. For it is other judges who are most likely to
have the skills, experience, and knowledge to bring misguided judges
"to book, when they go wrong" and who will most likely "take the
trouble to understand" them.
B. Mandatory Written Explanations of Sentences
A return to a discretionary system should and must be accompa-
nied by the adoption of legislation that would require judges to ex-
123 See supra Part H.A; see also Tchao, supra note 91, at 362 (noting that appellate review
"instills public confidence in the criminal justice system").
124 See Forrest G. Alogna, Note, Double Jeopardy, Acquittal Appeals, and the Law-Fact Dis-
tinction, 86 CoRNELL uL. Ray. 1131, 1141 (2001).
125 Tchao, supra note 91, at 361.
126 Cf Berman, supra note 81, at 93-94 (arguing that federal judges' marginalization
in modem federal sentencing stems from their failure to "fulfill their role as sentencing
lawmakers within the [Sentencing Reform Act]").
127 See Tchao, supra note 91, at 349.
128 Id. As Simon E. Sobeloff, former Solicitor General and Chief Judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, commented: "Equally to be avoided are two ex-
tremes: on the one hand the undeviating rigidity of statutes and on the other unappealable
and sometimes capricious and inflamed sentencing by a single [person] on the bench."
Simon E. Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appellate Review7, 41 A.B.A.J. 13,
17 (1955), quoted in Tchao, supra note 91, at 349.
129 LEARNED HAND, How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision7, in THE SPIxrr OF
LIBERTY 103, 110 (3d ed. 1963), quoted in Pataki, supra note 120, at 470.
20021 1279
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
plain the basis for their sentencing decisions in written opinions. 30
In the absence of written opinions, judges are frequently rendered
voiceless and defenseless in the face of public scrutiny.131 Instituting a
system requiring mandatory written explanations would not hinder ju-
dicial independence and would greatly strengthen judicial accounta-
bility. It would provide reasonable explanations for sentences that
might otherwise be considered unjustifiably disparate or unduly leni-
ent. Finally, it would provide a basis for informed appellate review.13 2
C. Broad "Unduly Lenient or Unreasonable" Appeal Provisions
What this Note does not advocate is the adoption of a
prosecutorial sentence appeal right without first dispensing with ex-
isting sentencing guidelines.133 Adopting prosecutorial sentence ap-
peals while maintaining existing guidelines would only magnify the
already expansive degree of prosecutorial discretion and the potential
for abuse that exist under the prevailing sentencing models. 34 As
Professor Jeffrey Standen notes, the prosecutor is "clearly now the
most powerful player in the criminal justice system."'31 5 He further
explains:
It was predictable that an attempt to control the discretion in-
herent in the criminal justice system by trying to eliminate one facet
of it, as was attempted with the Sentencing Guidelines, would have
the harmful consequence of merely concentrating its exercise in the
hands of another actor. The guidelines transfer the power of the
judge to the prosecutor.13 6
130 One argument against instituting a requirement for written explanations is that it
would add substantially to the workload of trialjudges. The same argument may be made
against instituting prosecutorial sentence appeals because such a system would increase the
workload of appellate judges. While this argument is undoubtedly true, as Judge Frankel
has stated, it is hardly enough "to warrant much discussion. Considering all the things on
which... judges ponder, the effort to make sentences more rational and just would hardly
seem unworthy of their labors." MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHouT
ORDER 78 (1973).
131 See supra notes 92-93.
132 Discretionary sentencing schemes traditionally have not required written explana-
tions for sentences,
and that may explain in part why in many jurisdictions allowing for limited
appellate review under an abuse standard, such review has had only a lim-
ited impact .... [M]eaningful review [is] often impossible to achieve ab-
sent a statement of grounds by the sentencing judge and the development
of standards against which those grounds [can] be assessed.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.3(d) (2d ed. 1992).
133 Notably, no other Western country has adopted sentencing guidelines comparable
to those of the United States. Tonry, supra note 101, at 200.
134 See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
135 Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471,
1513 (1993).
136 Id. at 1537-38.
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The very premise of this Note is that prosecutorial sentence ap-
peal legislation be adopted as a substitute for sentencing guidelines
and mandatory minimums. 137 A return to a discretionary system, cou-
pled with the introduction of prosecutorial sentence appeal legisla-
tion, would return sentencing discretion to an appropriately impartial
party-thejudge-while confining prosecutorial discretion to a more
reasonable yet sufficiently accommodating level. It would establish a
balance of power in the courtroom, giving sentencing judges the abil-
ity to control prosecutorial abuses of discretion 138 while affording
prosecutors a concomitant right to correct judicial abuses of discre-
tion through appeal.
As noted in Part I, some states with existing statutes condition the
availability of prosecutorial sentence appeals on judicial deviation
from existing sentencing guidelines.' 3 9 These statutes should be dis-
pensed with, along with the sentencing guidelines to which they are
tied, and replaced with "unduly lenient or otherwise unreasonable"
appeal provisions.' 40 Some may worry that allowing for sentence ap-
peals on such broad grounds could open the floodgates to a stream of
baseless appeals by prosecutors. This concern, however, should be
tempered by the fact that prosecutors, as compared to defendants,
have less personal investment in appealing sentences. This, coupled
with the fact that prosecutors are frequently overburdened with heavy
caseloads, leads to the conclusion that most prosecutorial appeals will
137 It remains to be seen whether the Massachusetts legislature will take this approach
to sentencing reform. Despite widespread calls for sentencing reform, the passing of 2001
merely saw the maintenance of the status quo. Both the Massachusetts Proposal for
prosecutorial sentence appeals, see supra note 72, and the most recent sentencing guideline
bill, see supra note 75, were introduced without being enacted into law. See also Ralph Ra-
nalli, Finneran Vows to Pass Sentence Guidelines, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2001, at BI (ac-
knowledging "long wrangling" from camps with competing viewpoints over the proper
form reform should take). The sentencing guideline bill incorporates prosecutorial sen-
tence appeals into its mandatory sentencing guideline scheme. See Ranalli, supra note 75.
Thus, should this bill be passed by the Massachusetts Senate, the balance of power in Mas-
sachusetts courts will be unduly tipped towards the prosecutors.
138 See supra text accompanying note 115.
139 See supra Part I.B.2.
140 It is unlikely that Congress will abolish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines any time in
the near future. See Bowman, supra note 114, at 350. See generally KATE STrrH &JOSE A.
CABRANES, FEAR OFJUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (dis-
cussing proposals for reforming the Guidelines themselves as well as alternative proposals
for reforming the federal sentencing system upon the eventual rejection of the Guidelines).
This Note therefore advocates state reform. Many states, including Massachusetts, still
have indeterminate sentencing structures, while states with determinate structures may be
more inclined than Congress to dispense with their existing guidelines. See Richard S.
Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LouIs U.
LJ. 425, 427 (2000). Louisiana and Wisconsin both had sentencing guidelines that they
later repealed, and "three other states have substantially weakened their guidelines." Id.
Furthermore, "at least six states have considered and rejected the idea of sentencing guide-
lines." Id.
2002] 1281
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
be grounded in professional judgment that an error has occurred,
and not in frivolity. As an added safeguard, state legislatures could
adopt an approval procedure similar to that under the federal sys-
tem, 141 requiring prosecutors to obtain the approval of the state attor-
ney general as a prerequisite to appealing.
D. Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review
Further, the adoption of an abuse of discretion review standard
would deter overzealous prosecutors from making unfounded "leni-
ency" or "unreasonableness" appeals in the first instance, and would
ensure their failure when they do occur. Indeed, a summary dismissal
procedure, akin to a motion for summary judgment, could be utilized
by appeal boards to extinguish patently unfounded appeals before
they are given any serious consideration.
In 1996, the Supreme Court established that appellate sentence
review under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines requires a deferential
standard of review, especially on findings of fact.142 In Koon v. United
States,143 the government appealed the sentences imposed on two Los
Angeles Police Department officers convicted on federal charges for
the beating of Rodney King.'4 The federal district court had granted
a downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the resulting
sentences de novo. 145 The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of
Appeals should have deferred to the trial court under an abuse of
discretion standard.146
Koon established that an abuse of discretion standard applies to
sentence review under the Guidelines. However, it remains unclear
whether the Court's holding would apply to appellate sentence review
outside of guideline structures, as when an appeal occurs under the
broad "leniency" or "unreasonableness" grounds advocated for in this
Note. Policy dictates that abuse of discretion is indeed the appropri-
ate standard for appellate review under "leniency" or "unreasonable-
141 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
142 Cf Tchao, supra note 91, at 346 n.3 (explaining that "the fact that sentencing may
require a discretionary judgment does not mean that it should escape review altogether,"
and noting that "in other areas of the law discretionaryjudgments are subject to a deferen-
tial standard of review (i.e., abuse of discretion)" (citing Daniel E. Wathen, Disparity and the
Need for Sentencing Guidelines in Maine: A Proposal for Enhanced Appellate Review, 40 ME. L.
REv. 1, 5 n.10 (1988))).
143 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
144 See id. at 85-90.
145 See id. at 89-90.
146 Id. at 91; cf. Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of SentencingDiscretion: Koon's
Failure to Recognize the Reshaping ofJudicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REv. 493,
550 (1999) (critiquing the lack of clarity of the abuse of discretion standard of review
adopted in Koon).
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ness" appeal statutes. Taking the Horton case as an example, if critics
of the decision are correct, then appellate review under an abuse of
discretion standard would have sufficed to correct Judge Lopez's mis-
judgment.147 A more searching standard of review is neither neces-
sary for sentence review to function effectively nor desirable, for a
stricter review standard would only unnecessarily complicate the re-
view board's task. Further, the abuse of discretion standard alleviates
the main argument against appellate review: that the appellate court's
lack of personal exposure to defendants and victims impairs its ability
to make intelligent sentencing decisions.148
E. Administrative Agencies Charged with the Task of Compiling
State Sentencing Statistics
Admittedly, if prosecutorial appeal legislation were to replace ex-
isting mandatory sentencing laws, one of the goals behind the existing
legislation-reducing disparity in sentences-would be sacrificed to
some degree. However, the number of disparate sentences could be
limited by creating administrative agencies charged with the task of
compiling state sentencing statistics. 149 These statistics could assist
both trial judges devising sentences and appellate judges reviewing
those sentences, thereby reducing disparity. 150 Furthermore, after
prosecutorial sentence appeal legislation has been in place for some
time, a common law on sentencing, arising from appellate opinions,
will emerge.' 51 This body of law will then help guide sentencing
judges, further reducing sentencing disparity. 152
In any event, the overriding emphasis that sentencing guidelines
place on uniformity is often at the expense of individual fairness.
While it is important to prevent substantial sentencing disparities, it is
also important to keep in mind the fact that no two defendants are
completely alike. As the French philosopher Michel de Montaigne
once said, "[r] esemblance does not make things so much alike as dif-
147 Cf supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing public outrage at Judge Lo-
pez's ruling).
148 See Tchao, supra note 91, at 401 (explaining that this argument against appellate
review is further alleviated by removing the appellate court's power to alter sentences
under its review).
149 Id. at 402 (footnote omitted).
150 See id. at 402-03.
151 Id. at 403. According to Professor Richard Frase, a "rich body of appellate case law"
surrounding Minnesota's sentencing guidelines has already emerged in that state's courts.
See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JusT. 363, 398
(1997). Indeed, had prosecutorial sentence appeals been implemented sooner, a common
lav on sentencing would presumably already be in place. The sentencing principles
emerging from this common law perhaps could have prevented the many current propos-
als for "drastic remedies which cut against the grain of the law." Lois G. FORER, CRIMINALS
AND VicrmIs 311 (1980).
152 See Tchao, supra note 91, at 403.
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ference makes them unlike. Nature has committed herself to make
nothing other that was not different."' 53 Prosecutorial sentence ap-
peals, as an alternative to mandatory sentencing laws, will shift the
main focus of sentencing policy from uniformity to judicial accounta-
bility. In doing so, only blind uniformity in sentencing will be
sacrificed.
CONCLUSION
On a final note, state legislatures and the public must acknowl-
edge that retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation are not the only
functions our criminal justice system is designed to serve. If more at-
tention were paid to the goal of rehabilitation, recidivism rates would
be lower, prisons would be less crowded, 54 and crime would be less
prevalent. Rehabilitation, however, often is achieved more effectively
outside of prison walls than within them. In an appropriate case,
where an assessment of all relevant variables leads to the conclusion
that imprisonment may do more harm than good, a supervised non-
custodial sentence may be best for the individual as well as for society.
This proposition, when expressed by others in the past, has met with
stiff resistance from the victims' rights movement. However, under a
system of prosecutorial sentence appeals, misjudgments regarding the
propriety of a probationary sentence in a given case will not only be
less frequent, but will also be more susceptible to correction. Both the
Supreme Court and the ABA 155 have expressed their support for
prosecutorial sentence appeals-the former having done so more
than two decades ago.156 State legislatures would be wise to follow.
153 Wathen, supra note 142, at 1 (quoting Of Experience, in MONTAIGNE, SELECTED ESSAYS
537, 537 (Charles Cotton-W. Hazlitt trans., 1949)).
154 A 1998 study by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency attributes the
increased incarceration rates of recent years to overall increases in sentence lengths. See
Austin, supra note 101, at 26.
155 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING Standard 18-8.3 (3d ed. 1994).
The most recent Standards for CriminalJustice Sentencing, promulgated by the ABA, takes the
following view:
[A]ppeals from sentences should be subject to the normal principle that
the right to initiate appeals should be afforded to both parties to the trial
court proceedings. The law regarding sentence determination and sen-
tence imposition has matured in the past twenty-five years. An important
part of any mature body of legal norms and procedures is the oversight
provided by appellate review.... The manifest value of appellate review of
sentences is best realized if both parties have the right to take appeals.
1no156 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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